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James Madison's Celebrated
Report of 1800: The Transformation of
the Tenth Amendment
Kurt T. Lash*
Introduction
It has become commonplace to describe the Rehnquist Court as having
staged a "federalism revolution."1 Although the current status of the revolu-
tion is in dispute,2 historical treatment of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
under Chief Justice Rehnquist no doubt will emphasize a resurgence of feder-
alism and limited construction of federal power.3 Cases like Gregory v. Ash-
croft,4 New York v. United States,5 United States v. Lopez, 6 Printz v. United
States,7 Alden v. Maine,8 and United States v. Morrison9 all share a common
rule of interpretation: narrow construction of federal power to interfere with
matters believed best left under state control.10
The textual hook for this rule of strict construction has been the Tenth
Amendment. 1 As Justice O'Connor wrote in the seminal federalism revolu-
tion case, Gregory v. Ashcroft:
* Professor of Law and W. Joseph Ford Fellow, Loyola Law School. The author would
like to thank Katherine Lash for her outstanding editorial assistance. This Article was awarded
the top prize in the 2005 Peterson Prize National Writing Competition for scholarly writing on
the Tenth Amendment by the Willamette Center for Law and Government.
1 The references are ubiquitous in current literature. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (describing the Rehnquist Court's "federal-
ism revival"); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Crimi-
nal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003); Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism,
and the Distrust of Politics, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1781, 1784 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making
of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 569, 651 (2003); J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, Our Structural Constitution, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1687, 1690 (2004). To be
sure, not all of these authors agree on the scope or value of the revolution. See generally Sympo-
sium, Is the Supreme Court Undoing the New Deal: The Impact of the Rehnquist Court's New
Federalism, 12 WIDENER L.J. 373 (2003) (discussing the federalism of the Rehnquist Court).
2 See David G. Savage, Finite Federalism, A.B.A. J., July 2004, at 20; Ernest A. Young,
The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) ("We have seen neither the
revolution that partisans of states' rights might have wished nor the deluge that many national-
ists feared."); see also Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (upholding federal ban on state-
authorized medicinal use of marijuana).
3 See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002).
4 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
5 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
6 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
7 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
8 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
9 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
10 See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
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The Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people. The States thus retain substantial sovereign
authority under our constitutional system. As James Madison
put it:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numer-
ous and indefinite.... The powers reserved to the several
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties
of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.12
In Gregory, the Court reasoned that statutes should be construed, when-
ever possible, to avoid interfering with matters traditionally left to the
states.13 In United States v. Lopez, the Court expanded upon Gregory's theo-
retical approach and crafted a rule of construction limiting the scope of Con-
gress's commerce power for the first time since the New Deal.14 Returning to
"first principles," Rehnquist once again quoted James Madison's assertion in
the Federalist Papers that "[tihe powers delegated by the proposed Constitu-
tion to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to re-
main in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. This
constitutionally mandated division of authority was adopted by the Framers
to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties."'15 The Tenth Amendment,
the Court believed, mandated a rule of construction that preserved this divi-
sion of federal and state authority.16 Although prior cases had broadly con-
strued federal commerce power, the Lopez Court refused to allow any
further expansion lest the division of power called for by the Tenth Amend-
ment disappear altogether.17
In a concurrence joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy agreed
that the Gun Free School Zones Act of 199018 violated the proper balance of
power between the state and federal government-a balance established by
the Tenth Amendment:
While the intrusion on state sovereignty may not be as severe in this
instance as in some of our recent Tenth Amendment cases, the in-
trusion is nonetheless significant. Absent a stronger connection or
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.").
12 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (first quotation omitted) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
13 Id. at 460-61.
14 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552-59 (1995).
15 Id. (quotations omitted).
16 See id. at 567-68 (refusing to pile inference upon inference to expand federal powers).
17 See id.
18 Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844, invalidated by
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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identification with commercial concerns that are central to the
Commerce Clause, that interference contradicts the federal balance
the Framers designed and that this Court is obliged to enforce.' 9
Justice Thomas also concurred, adding that the Court's construction of
federal commerce power came "close to turning the Tenth Amendment on its
head," and urging the Court to reexamine its post-New Deal interpretation
of the Interstate Commerce Clause. 20
In Morrison, a majority of the Rehnquist Court repeated the Tenth
Amendment-based rule of construction that "requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local," and struck down the Violence
Against Women Act.21 In his dissent, Justice Souter attacked the majority's
rule of strict construction and argued that the political process should enforce
the constraints of the Tenth Amendment, not judicial intervention.22 Ac-
cording to Souter, the federalism of the majority was based not on the text of
the Constitution, "but on what has been termed the spirit of the Tenth
Amendment. 23
Souter's criticism-that the federalism jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court is not based on any reasonable reading of constitutional text-has
been repeated by a number of scholars. 24 In fact, the text of the Tenth
Amendment says nothing about how to construe federal power, only that all
nondelegated powers "are reserved to the states respectively or to the peo-
ple."'25 Justice O'Connor herself has conceded that the Tenth Amendment
suggests rather than demands the Court's federalist rule of construction. 26
Even if it is true that the Tenth Amendment reflects the Founders' commit-
ment to a dual system of government, it is difficult to escape the accusation
that the Court's federalism jurisprudence is based on what Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes derisively described as "some invisible radiation from the
general terms of the Tenth Amendment. '27
Even if not demanded by the text of the Tenth Amendment, the federal-
ism jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, at least historically, is supported
19 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20 Id. at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring).
21 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (citations omitted) (invalidating
a portion of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902).
22 Id. at 648 (Souter, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 648 n.18 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
24 See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 288-93 (2000); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for
a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 899 (1999); Edward L. Rubin & Mal-
colm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 927-28
(1994).
25 U.S. CON sT. amend. X.
26 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) ("The Tenth Amendment
likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth
Amendment itself .... Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal
Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.");
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 585 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("The spirit of the Tenth Amendment, of course, is that the States will retain their integrity in a
system in which the laws of the United States are nevertheless supreme.").
27 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
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by a rule of construction expressed in the text of the Constitution: the Ninth
Amendment. 28 This proposition may seem a startling one, particularly in
light of the common libertarian reading of the Ninth.29 Originally, however,
Founders like James Madison viewed the Ninth Amendment, not the Tenth,
as a rule limiting the construction of federal power.30 According to Madison,
the Tenth Amendment prohibited the federal government from exercising
any "source of power not within the constitution itself. '31 The Ninth Amend-
ment, however, went further and "guard[ed] against a latitude of interpreta-
tion" when it came to the construction of enumerated federal power.32
Although related in their federalist ends, the duties of these two amendments
were distinct. The Tenth Amendment established the principle of enumer-
ated power, with all nondelegated power reserved to the states.33 The Ninth,
on the other hand, limited the interpretation of those federal powers that
were enumerated. 34 In this way, the rule of the Ninth preserved the principle
of the Tenth.
Although this historical understanding of the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments has long since passed out of memory,35 early constitutional commenta-
tors like St. George Tucker 36 and John Taylor 37 shared the Madisonian
reading of these amendments. In Houston v. Moore,38 the first Supreme
Court case to include a discussion of the Ninth Amendment, Justice Joseph
Story followed Madison's lead and cited the Ninth Amendment as supporting
a limited interpretation of federal power in order to preserve the concurrent
powers of the states. 39
Over time, however, courts and commentators came to view the Tenth
Amendment as also expressing a rule of narrow, or strict, construction of
federal power. By the time of the New Deal, countless state and federal
courts had cited the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in pari materia as coequal
28 U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
29 For examples of libertarian readings of the Ninth Amendment, see discussions of the
Ninth in RANDY BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY 253-69 (2004); CALVIN MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CON-
SrTrnON'S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995); and essays reprinted in 1-2 THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (discussing natural or preferred rights).
30 See, e.g., James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2,
1791), in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 480, 489 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
34 See id. amend. IX.
35 See, e.g., BENNETT PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1995) (describ-
ing the Ninth as having received little historical attention).
36 See St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 140,
140-44 (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exchange reprint ed. 1996) (1803) [hereinafter BLACK-
STONE'S COMMENTARIES].
37 See JOHN TAYLOR, NEW VIEWS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 96
(Washington City, Way & Gideon 1823).
38 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
39 Id. at 48-50.
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restrictions on the scope of enumerated federal power.40 In the aftermath of
the New Deal revolution, however, the original federalist application of the
Ninth Amendment was lost, and when the Rehnquist Court reinvigorated the
concept of federalism, the Court embraced the Tenth Amendment as the tex-
tual basis for limiting federal power.41 Over a period of two hundred years,
courts and commentators thus transformed the Tenth Amendment from a
declaration of principle to an independent rule of construction. This Article
explores how that transformation occurred.
Part I explores the drafting and early interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment. Originally, Madison envisioned the Tenth Amendment as a
declaration of enumerated federal power, with the Ninth Amendment estab-
lishing a rule of strict construction of those enumerated powers. Absent a
rule controlling the scope of interpreted federal power, the declaration of the
Tenth Amendment risked becoming an empty promise. In this way, Madison
intended that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments work together, with the
principle of the Tenth guarded by the application of the Ninth.
Part II considers how, over time, the Tenth Amendment came to be un-
derstood as expressing its own rule of strict construction. James Madison's
Tenth Amendment-based argument in his 1800 Report on the Alien and Se-
dition Acts (also known as Madison's "Report of 1800") helped fuel this
transformation. 42 Although fully consistent with his original reading of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments,43 Madison's Report became a key document
in later states' rights advocacy and led to the view that the Tenth Amend-
ment, rather than the Ninth, stood as the primary guardian of limited federal
power.
Part III looks at the modern period and traces the gradual emergence of
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as antagonists rather than co-guardians of
the principle of federalism. At the time of the New Deal, both the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments were reduced to mere "truisms." By the time the Su-
preme Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut44 in 1965, the historical link
between the Ninth and Tenth Amendments had long since been forgotten.
The new interpretation of the Ninth presented it as textual support for judi-
cial enforcement of rights against the states. Not surprising, when the Rehn-
quist Court reinvigorated federalism as a constraint on federal power in the
1990s, the Court ignored the modern "libertarian" Ninth Amendment and
relied on the Tenth Amendment alone as support for its rule of strict
construction.
40 The full jurisprudence is presented in Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth
Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005).
41 See supra notes 11-12, 16-17 and accompanying text.
42 See JAMES MADISON, REPORT ON THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1800), in WRITINGS,
supra note 30, at 608.
43 See James Madison, Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789),
in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
1786-1870, at 221, 221-22 (Dept. of State ed., 1905) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
44 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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The Article concludes with a brief discussion of the potential conse-
quences of returning both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to their historic
roles.
I. A Brief History of the Tenth Amendment and the Rule of
Strict Construction
The historical precursor to the Tenth Amendment was Article II of the
Articles of Confederation, which declared that "[e]ach state retains its sover-
eignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right,
which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in
Congress assembled. 45
Because the states had existed for more than a decade under the Articles
of Confederation as thirteen independent and sovereign states, 46 the degree
to which the proposed Constitution would diminish (or eradicate) state sov-
ereignty was a major issue in the ratification debates. Despite Federalist as-
surances to the contrary, Anti-Federalists warned of the potential
consolidation of the states under a national government with unlimited
power.47 Although a sufficient number of states eventually agreed to ratify
the Constitution, a number of them did so with the understanding that the
scope of federal power would be strictly limited.48 Several state conventions
included statements of principle along with their notices of ratification de-
claring their understanding that all nondelegated powers, jurisdictions, and
rights were reserved to the states. 49 The New York convention, for example,
declared
that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said
Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States,
or the departments of the government thereof, remains to the peo-
ple of the several states, or to their respective state governments, to
whom they may have granted the same; and that those clauses in the
said Constitution, which declare, that Congress shall not have or
exercise certain powers, do not imply that Congress is entitled to
any powers not given by the said Constitution; but such clauses are
to be construed either as exceptions to certain specified powers, or
as inserted merely for greater caution.50
45 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II (1781).
46 See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969).
47 See SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING
TRADITION IN AMERICA 1788-1828 (1999) (discussing Anti-Federalist thought).
48 The declarations of understanding and proposed amendments are reproduced in 1 THE
RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 353-59.
49 For a more complete discussion of these statements of principle, see Kurt T. Lash, The
Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331, 355-58 (2004).
50 Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention (July 26, 1788), in 1 THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 356, 356; see also Ratifications-State of New York,
in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787,
at 327, 329 (Jonathan Elliot ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1996) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]
("Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot be abridged or vio-
lated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the said Constitution, and in confi-
[Vol. 74:165
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Other states, not content to leave the matter to a simple "declaration of
principle," ratified the Constitution on the understanding that amendments
would be added as soon as was practicable.5 1 Several states submitted lists of
proposed amendments, all of which included a clause expressly declaring the
reserved powers and rights of the states.52 Virginia's proposal, in essence,
went beyond New York's declaration of assumed principle and called for an
express constitutional declaration "[t]hat each State in the Union shall re-
spectively retain every power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this Con-
stitution delegated to the Congress of the United States or to the
departments of the Federal Government. 53
The Federalists, who advocated the adoption of the Constitution, had no
objection to such an amendment. After all, they had argued in the state rati-
fication conventions that the structure of the Constitution necessarily implied
such a principle of limited enumerated federal power.5 4 Accordingly,
Madison faced no opposition when he proposed an amendment stating that
"the powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively. 55
The absence of opposition in this case, however, does not indicate the
presence of enthusiasm. Madison's own remarks in introducing this provi-
sion to the House were decidedly tepid:
I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the State
conventions, that several are particularly anxious that it should be
declared in the Constitution, that the powers not therein delegated
should be reserved to the several States. Perhaps words which may
define this more precisely than the whole of the instrument now
does, may be considered as superfluous. I admit they may be
deemed unnecessary: but there can be no harm in making such a
declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as stated. I am
sure I understand it so, and do therefore propose it.56
Madison clearly was not convinced of the necessity of such a clause. He
and other Federalists originally had resisted adding a Bill of Rights, in part
because they believed that the Constitution, fairly construed, already estab-
dence that the amendments which shall have been proposed to the said Constitution will receive
an early and mature consideration,-We, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the
people of the state of New York, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the said
Constitution.").
51 See, e.g., Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 675 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997); Ratifications-Rhode Island, in 1
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 50, at 334, 335 ("We, the said delegates... do, by these presents,
assent to and ratify the said Constitution. In full confidence, nevertheless, that ... the amend-
ments hereafter proposed and undermentioned shall be agreed to and ratified."); see also LEO-
NARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 31-32 (1999).
52 See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 675 (including state drafts of
proposed constitutional amendments).
53 Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 51.
54 See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 12, at 292; MADISON, supra note 42, at 609.
55 House of Representatives, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITItrION 20, 25-26 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
56 Id. at 28.
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lished the principle of limited enumerated federal power.57 Still, Madison
acceded to the demands of the states, if only to head off a second constitu-
tional convention, 58 and dutifully proposed the "superfluous" Tenth
Amendment. 59
In fact, even the most vigorous proponents of states' rights also were less
than enthusiastic about the proposed Tenth Amendment. They did not ob-
ject to Madison's draft or believe the principle unimportant; it was that they
believed that the Tenth Amendment was unlikely to have any "real effect";60
it was already well understood that all nondelegated powers remained with
the states. 61 New York, after all, ratified the Constitution on this presumed
understanding, even without the addition of the Tenth Amendment.62
Worse, by adding the final phrase, "or to the people," some objected that the
Tenth Amendment would actually undermine the principle that all nondele-
gated powers were reserved to the states.6
3
The problem was not that anyone seriously disputed that the proposed
government would be one of enumerated powers. The structure of the Con-
stitution and the enumeration of federal power in Article I, Section 8 seemed
to clearly imply that principle. 64 The problem was how to prevent the undue
expansion of those powers that were enumerated. 65 Federal courts would be
empowered to construe the Constitution, and as branches of the federal gov-
ernment, they were believed likely to do so in favor of federal power.66 Nor
57 See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 12, at 292-93.
58 See Kurt T. Lash, Rejecting Conventional Wisdom: Federalist Ambivalence in the Fram-
ing and Implementation of Article V, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 197, 222-23 (1994).
59 See Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 55, at 28.
60 See Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5 Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 43, at 222, 223. According to Randolph, "The twelfth [the Tenth]
amendment does not appear to me to have any real effect, unless it be to excite a dispute be-
tween the United States, and every particular state, as to what is delegated. It accords pretty
nearly with what our convention proposed; but being once adopted, it may produce new matter
for the cavils of the designing." Id.
61 See, e.g., Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 55, at 28 (noting the superfluous
nature of the proposed amendment).
62 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
63 See Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, in JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
VIRGINIA 60, 64 (Richmond, Thomas W. White 1827) [hereinafter VIRGINIA SENATE JOURNAL].
64 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
65 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 905-07 (1985), for a discussion of Anti-Federalist concerns about judicial interpreta-
tion of the proposed Constitution.
66 According to "Brutus":
The judicial power will operate to effect ... an entire subversion of the legislative,
executive and judicial powers of the individual states. Every adjudication of the
supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the
general government, will affect the limits of the state jurisdiction. In proportion as
the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be re-
stricted .... Not only will the constitution justify the courts in inclining to this
mode of explaining it, but they will be interested in using this latitude of
interpretation.
BRUTUS No. 11 (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 420-21 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981). See Lash, supra note 49, at 351-53, for additional examples of Anti-Federalist
concerns.
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would the addition of express restrictions on federal power necessarily solve
the problem.67 Indeed, adding such restrictions might even prove dangerous,
for the enumeration of certain rights might be construed to allow federal
power to extend to all matters except those expressly prohibited.68 Limiting
federal power required a rule preventing unduly broad interpretations of
enumerated federal authority, thus ensuring that the people of the individual
states would retain significant autonomy over those matters that were best
left to local control.69 A number of state ratifying conventions proposed the
addition of such a rule of interpretation-proposals that Madison relied on in
drafting his own version of what would become the Ninth Amendment. 70
The Virginia ratifying convention, for example, proposed the following
amendment, which Madison himself helped draft:71
That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not exercise
certain powers be not interpreted in any manner whatsoever to ex-
tend the powers of Congress. But that they may be construed either
as making exceptions to the specified powers where this shall be the
case, or otherwise as inserted merely for greater caution.72
Similarly, Madison's original version of the Ninth Amendment, which he
presented to the House, stated:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor
of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge
the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as actual limi-
tations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.73
Madison's version of the Ninth Amendment thus echoed the Virginia propo-
sal and satisfied the demands of other state conventions for a provision
67 See Statement of James Iredell (July 29, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 50, at
164, 167.
68 According to James Iredell:
[I]t would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights
which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the strong-
est manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired by the
government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to enumerate every
one. Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will
immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.
Id. (speaking in the North Carolina ratifying convention); see also James Madison, Speech in
Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789), in WRrrNoS, supra note 30, at
437, 448-49.
69 See Lash, supra note 49, at 353-55 (discussing the possibility of implementing rules of
constitutional interpretation).
70 See, e.g., Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 51, at 675; see
also Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Nov. 20, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 43, at 215 (noting that the amendment corresponds to the proposition made
by the Virginia convention). See Lash, supra note 49, at 358-40, for a complete discussion of
these proposals on interpretation of the Constitution.
71 James Madison was a member of the committee that drafted the Virginia proposal, and
he later noted the role the Virginia proposals played in his proposed draft of the Bill of Rights.
See Madison, supra note 70.
72 Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention, supra note 51, at 675.
73 Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 55, at 25.
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preventing the undue extension of federal power.74 Madison's version also
prevented any implied extension of federal power arising from the addition
of specific enumerated rights.
Madison's proposals were referred to a select committee (of which
Madison was a member), and when a streamlined version of the Bill of
Rights came back to the full House, the Ninth Amendment no longer con-
tained the language limiting the extension of federal power. 75 The deleted
language raised concerns in Virginia, where Edmund Randolph feared that
his state's call for a provision limiting the construction of federal power had
gone unheeded. 76 Madison responded that protecting the retained rights of
the people amounted to the same thing as prohibiting the constructive en-
largement of federal power.77 In a letter to George Washington discussing
Randolph's concerns about the Ninth Amendment, Madison explained that
"[ilf a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the rights retained,
it would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter be secured, by declar-
ing that they shall not be abridged, or that the former shall not be ex-
tended. ' 78 According to Madison, preserving retained rights amounted to
the same thing as prohibiting the undue extension of power.79 In Madison's
view, the final draft of the Ninth Amendment thus continued to express the
same principle of limited federal power-only now it expressed this principle
as a matter of retained rights.80 Under the Tenth Amendment, Congress had
74 See, e.g., Amendments Proposed by the New York Convention, supra note 50, at 356;
see also U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
75 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1050
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971).
76 See, e.g., Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 43, at 219.
77 See Madison, supra note 43, at 221-22.
78 Id. at 222.
79 See id.
80 See id. Later constitutional commentators would agree with Madison that the Ninth
both preserved retained rights and prevented constructive expansion of federal power. For ex-
ample, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story wrote:
In regard to another suggestion, that the affirmance of certain rights might dispar-
age others, or might lead to argumentative implications in favour of other powers,
it might be sufficient to say, that such a course of reasoning could never be sus-
tained upon any solid basis; and it could never furnish any just ground of objection,
that ingenuity might pervert, or usurpation overleap, the true sense. That objection
will equally lie against all powers, whether large or limited, whether national or
state, whether in a bill of rights, or in a frame of government. But a conclusive
answer is, that such an attempt may be interdicted, (as it has been,) by a positive
declaration in such a bill of rights, that the enumeration of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 720-21
(photo. reprint 1991) (1833). Although a number of commentators have suggested that the
"powers" language of the original draft of the Ninth Amendment eventually ended up in the
Tenth Amendment, there is no historical evidence to support this proposition, and it seems
clearly refuted by Madison's letters and speeches, and later commentators like Joseph Story.
But see 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 253-69 (arguing that the
Ninth Amendment creates a presumption of liberty that limits federal powers); MASSEY, supra
note 29 (arguing that the Ninth Amendment limits federal power by providing judicially enforce-
able unenumerated rights).
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no powers but those enumerated. 81 Under the Ninth, Congress and the
courts could not construe those enumerated powers in a manner denying or
disparaging rights retained by the people. 82
Madison repeated his power-constraining interpretation of the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments while the Bill of Rights remained pending in the
critical state of Virginia.8 3 In a speech opposing the chartering of a national
bank in 1791, Madison argued that only an unduly broad interpretation of
federal power would allow Congress to create the Bank of the United
States.84 In their efforts to secure votes in favor of the Constitution, Federal-
ists had assured the state ratifying conventions that the Constitution would
not be construed in such a latitudinarian manner,85 and the ratifying states
themselves had issued declarations and proposed amendments which estab-
lished their understanding that the Constitution would not be so construed. 86
The adoption of the pending Ninth and Tenth Amendments would make this
assumed limited construction of federal power an express constitutional
mandate:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at
least, would be good authority with them [the state proposals]; all
these renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of construction,
excluding the latitude now contended for .... He read several of
the articles proposed, remarking particularly on the 11th. and 12th.
the former, as guarding against a latitude of interpretation-the lat-
ter, as excluding every source of power not within the constitution
itself.8
7
A few months after Madison gave this speech, Virginia voted in favor of
the last ten of twelve proposed amendments, and the Bill of Rights became
part of the Constitution.88 This Bill, like the Constitution itself, begins with a
preamble:
THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of
their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to pre-
81 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
82 See id. amend. IX.
83 Objections regarding the final version of the Ninth Amendment led Edmund Randolph
to halt Virginia's efforts to ratify the Bill of Rights. Anti-Federalists managed to exploit Ran-
dolph's initial concerns (which he overcame) and delay ratification of the Bill of Rights for two
years. Correspondence between James Madison, Hardin Burnley, and George Washington that
discusses the Virginia debate can be found in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 43, at
219-31; see also Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, supra note 63, at 61-65 (discussing objections to the
Ninth Amendment); Lash, supra note 49, at 371-86 (discussing the Virginia debate).
84 See Madison, supra note 30, at 480, 482-85.
85 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
86 Madison, supra note 30, at 488-89; see also supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
87 Madison, supra note 30, at 489. Here, Madison refers to the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments as the eleventh and twelfth. Congress originally submitted twelve amendments to the
states for ratification; what we now know as the Ninth and Tenth were originally the eleventh
and twelfth proposed amendments on the list.
88 See JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE 73-74 (1789) (entry of Sept. 8);
Letter from George Washington to the Senate and House of Representatives (Dec. 30, 1791), in
5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 43, at 245.
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vent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory
and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the
ground of public confidence in the Government, will best ensure the
beneficent ends of its institutions. 89
As suggested by the Preamble, the Ninth Amendment acts as a restric-
tive clause, while the Tenth stands as a declaration of principle.90 As a re-
strictive clause, the Ninth preserves the principle enshrined in the Tenth.
Without such a rule preventing "misconstruction" of the Constitution, the
declaratory Tenth Amendment risks becoming an empty promise.91 To-
gether, however, the two amendments prevent the "misconstruction or
abuse" of federal power.
The proper construction of federal power soon became an issue during
the debate over the first Bank of the United States. In his opinion opposing
the creation of the bank, Thomas Jefferson argued that the "latitude of con-
struction" adopted by the bank's proponents would destroy the principle of
enumerated powers declared in the Tenth Amendment:
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this ground
that all powers not delegated to the U.S. by the Constitution, not
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states or to the
people .... If such a latitude of construction be allowed to [the
phrase "necessary and proper"] as to give any non-enumerated
power, it will go to every one, for the[r]e is no one which ingenuity
may not torture into a convenience, in some way or other, to some
one of so long a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all
the delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one phrase as before
observed .... The present is the case of a right remaining exclu-
sively with the states.92
Echoing Jefferson's concerns, Attorney General Edmund Randolph ob-
served that, although governments without constitutions might "claim a lati-
tude of power not always easy to ... determine[ ]," the federal government,
as "confessed by Congress, in the twelfth amendment," possessed only enu-
merated powers.93 Canvassing the various claimed sources of power for the
bank, Randolph concluded:
[A] similar construction on every specified federal power, will
stretch the arm of Congress into the whole circle of state legisla-
tion.... [L]et it be propounded as an eternal question to those who
build new powers on this clause, whether the latitude of construction
89 U.S. CONST. Bill of Rights pmbl. The Senate approved the Preamble to the Bill of
Rights on Tuesday, September 8, 1789. See JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE SENATE,
supra note 88, at 73.
90 See U.S. CONST. Bill of Rights pmbl.
91 See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
92 Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a Na-
tional Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 276-80 (Julian P.
Boyd ed., 1974) (quotations omitted).
93 Edmund Randolph, The Constitutionality of the Bank Bill (Feb. 12, 1791), in H. JEFFER-
SON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 3, 4 (1999).
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which they arrogate will not terminate in an unlimited power in
Congress? 94
Both Jefferson and Randolph read the Tenth Amendment as confirming
the establishment of a federal government of enumerated powers, with all
nondelegated powers reserved to the states.95 Unduly latitudinarian con-
structions of enumerated federal power threatened to undermine this ar-
rangement by creating, in essence, a government of unlimited power.
Accordingly, Randolph and Jefferson advocated a rule of strict construction
in order to preserve the principle announced by the Tenth Amendment. The
rule preserved the principle.
Madison, of course, read the Ninth Amendment to express just such a
rule,96 and early constitutional commentators agreed. In the very first Su-
preme Court opinion discussing the Ninth Amendment, Justice Joseph Story
followed the Madisonian reading of the Ninth and used it to support a limited
construction of federal power.97 In the 1820 case Houston v. Moore,98 Justice
Story wrote that federal power to discipline the militia should not be read as
exclusive of the concurrent power of individual states to establish their own
rules of militia discipline, so long as those rules did not conflict with any
federal statute.99 Story declared that "[iln all other cases not falling within
the classes already mentioned, it seems unquestionable that the States retain
concurrent authority with Congress, not only upon the letter and spirit of the
eleventh amendment of the constitution, but upon the soundest principles of
general reasoning." 100
Madison and Story were not alone in their reading of the Ninth as a
federalist rule of interpretation. In his 1803 View of the Constitution, St.
George Tucker likewise presented the Ninth Amendment as supporting a
federalist rule of strict construction of federal power,101 as did constitutional
94 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
95 See, e.g., Madison, supra note 30, at 480, 482-85; Randolph, supra note 93, at 4.
96 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text; Lash, supra note 49, at 392.
97 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 51-52 (Story, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 48-50 (Story, J., dissenting) (following the early convention of referring to the
Ninth as the eleventh amendment). Although written in a dissent, Story's description of the
Ninth and its protection of the concurrent powers of the states remained influential for over a
century. See Lash, supra note 40, at 613.
101 In his discussion of the proper interpretation of the Constitution, Tucker wrote:
As [a federal compact] it is to be construed strictly, in all cases where the antece-
dent rights of a state may be drawn in question [citing the Tenth Amendment]; as a
social compact it ought likewise to receive the same strict construction, wherever
the right of personal liberty, of personal security, or of private property may be-
come the subject of dispute; because every person whose liberty or property was
thereby rendered subject to the new government, was antecedently a member of a
civil society to whose regulations he had submitted himself, and under whose au-
thority and protection he still remains, in all cases not expressly submitted to the
new government [citing the Ninth and Tenth Amendments].
Tucker, supra note 36, at 151.
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commentator John Taylor. 102
Unlike Madison, Jefferson, and Randolph-who believed that preserv-
ing the Tenth required the addition of a rule of construction-St. George
Tucker believed that the Tenth Amendment itself expressed a rule of strict
construction. 10 3 According to Tucker, under the Tenth Amendment, the
Constitution "is to be construed strictly, in all cases where the antecedent
rights of state may be drawn in question."'1 4 This reading of the Tenth
Amendment seems somewhat awkward. The text of the Tenth simply de-
clares that Congress is granted only those powers enumerated in the Consti-
tution.105 The text says nothing about how broadly those delegated powers
are to be construed. Nevertheless, after 1800 and for the next 150 years,
courts and commentators cited both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as
expressing rules of strict construction of federal power. 106
This fact may surprise readers accustomed to reading the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments in opposition to one another. Since Griswold v. Con-
necticut, the Court has often read the Ninth Amendment as support for its
judicial invalidation of state laws, while the Tenth is most commonly associ-
ated with "states' rights." Historically, however, the two amendments were
read in pari materia, both representing a limitation on the power of the fed-
eral government to interfere with the states. 0 7 As late as 1948, the Supreme
Court continued to apply both amendments as twin guardians of federal-
ism.' 0 8 In Bute v. Illinois,109 the Supreme Court considered whether allowing
a defendant in a noncapital criminal prosecution to represent himself without
inquiring into whether he desired or could afford an attorney violated his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 110 Because the Sixth Amendment
required such an inquiry in federal court, the issue was whether this rule was
incorporated against the states."' In a five-four decision, Justice Harold Bur-
ton rejected the claim and provided an extended analysis of the Ninth and
102 In Construction Construed, and Constitutions Vindicated, political writer John Taylor
declared:
The [Ninth Amendment] prohibits a construction by which the rights retained by
the people shall be denied or disparaged; and the [Tenth] reserves to the states re-
spectively or to the people the powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohib-
ited to the states. The precision of these expressions is happily contrived to defeat a
construction, by which the origin of the union, or the sovereignty of the states,
could be rendered at all doubtful.
JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 46 (Richmond,
Shepherd & Pollard 1820) (quotations omitted).
103 Tucker, supra note 36, at 151.
104 Id.
105 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
106 See generally Lash, supra note 40, for a comprehensive presentation of this
jurisprudence.
107 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
108 See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 650-54 (1948).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 644.
111 See id. at 648-49.
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Tenth Amendments and their roles in interpreting the scope of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 12 According to Justice Burton:
One of the major contributions to the science of government that
was made by the Constitution of the United States was its division
of powers between the states and the Federal Government. The
compromise between state rights and those of a central government
was fully considered in securing the ratification of the Constitution
in 1787 and 1788. It was emphasized in the "Bill of Rights," ratified
in 1791. In the ten Amendments constituting such Bill, additional
restrictions were placed upon the Federal Government and particu-
larly upon procedure in the federal courts. None were placed upon
the states. On the contrary, the reserved powers of the states and of
the people were emphasized in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
This point of view is material in the instant cases in interpreting the
limitation which the Fourteenth Amendment places upon the
processes of law that may be practiced by the several states, includ-
ing Illinois. In our opinion this limitation is descriptive of a broad
regulatory power over each state and not of a major transfer by the
states to the United States of the primary and pre-existing power of
the states over court procedures in state criminal cases.113
In Bute, Justice Burton linked the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the
need to preserve "Home Rule,"'1 14 or, as earlier courts had phrased it, the
right of a state "to determine for itself its own political machinery and its own
domestic policies.1 15 Preserving that right required a rule of construction.
The Court in Bute applied such a rule, noting that the principles underlying
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are "material in the instant cases in inter-
preting the limitation which the Fourteenth Amendment places upon the
processes of law that may be practiced by the several states. 1 1 6
In limiting the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court's deci-
sion in Bute echoes similar reasoning in the more recent Morrison decision,
which narrowly interpreted the reach of Congress's Section 5 powers under
the Fourteenth Amendment in order to preserve state autonomy.117 By the
time the Court decided Morrison, however, the Ninth Amendment had al-
ready disappeared from the debate on federal powers. The Tenth Amend-
ment alone provided the textual hook for the Rehnquist Court's rule of strict
construction.1 18
This disappearance of the Ninth presents us with a mystery. Given that
it is the Ninth, not the Tenth, which literally expresses a rule of construction,
how did the Tenth Amendment come to share an equal role with the Ninth as
112 See id. at 650-54.
113 Id. at 650-51 (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 652.
115 Hawke v. Smith, 126 N.E. 400, 403 (Ohio 1919) (Wanamaker, J., concurring), rev'd, 253
U.S. 221 (1920).
116 Bute, 333 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).
117 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000).
118 See id. at 618 n.8 (citing the Tenth Amendment in support of its limited reading of
federal power).
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a rule of limited construction of federal power? More directly, how did the
Tenth come to replace the Ninth Amendment as a limiting rule of construc-
tion? Madison's public description of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
compounds this mystery. As Madison drafted both amendments and partici-
pated in the congressional debates, one would think Madison's description of
the Ninth as the relevant rule of construction would carry particular weight.
Ironically, it appears that Madison himself may have played a key, if
unintentional, role in refocusing attention away from the Ninth and onto the
Tenth Amendment as the textual basis for a rule of strict construction. In
one of the most influential documents Madison ever produced, the Report on
the Alien and Sedition Acts (also known as Madison's "Report of 1800"),
Madison presented the Tenth Amendment as the central constitutional text
for constraining the interpretation of federal power. 119 Although Madison's
reliance on the Tenth Amendment in his Report corresponds to his interpre-
tation of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in his speech on the Bank of the
United States, his "Report of 1800" took on a life of its own-as would the
Tenth Amendment.
1H. The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment
A. The Alien and Sedition Acts
In the aftermath of the so-called XYZ Affair, in which French officials
demanded bribes from an American peace delegation,120 and in the midst of
heightening tensions with France, Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition
Acts.12 1 The Sedition Act made the common-law offense of seditious libel a
federal crime, and inflaming an already politically charged atmosphere,122
Federalist judges enforced the Act against critics of the Adams
administration. 123
Defenders of the Sedition Act came dangerously close to claiming that
Congress had an unenumerated power to enforce the common law. The au-
thor of the Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions, 124 commonly
believed to be John Marshall, 2 5 argued that there was a "common or unwrit-
119 MADISON, supra note 42, at 608; see also infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
120 See ALBERT BOWMAN, THE STRUGGLE FOR NEUTRALITY: FRANCO-AMERICAN DIPLO-
MACY DURING THE FEDERALIST ERA 306-33 (1974), for a general discussion of the "XYZ Af-
fair" and the Federalist response.
121 The Alien and Sedition Acts were comprised of four statutes: the Alien Act, 8 ANNALS
OF CONG. 3744-46 (1798); the Alien Enemies Act, id. at 3753-54; the Naturalization Act, id. at
3739-42; and the Sedition Act, id. at 3776-77.
122 See Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in the Logic of Political Change,
108 YALE L.J. 1959, 1960 (1999).
123 See United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239, 239-40 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
124 See ADDRESS OF THE FIFTY-EIGHT FEDERAL MEMBERS OF THE VIRGINIA LEGISLA-
TURE TO THEIR FELLOW-CITIZENS IN JANUARY, 1799 (Augusta, Mn., Peter Edes 1799); see also
John Marshall, Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22, 1799), in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 136.
125 There is a mystery surrounding the author of the Minority Report. The Founders' Con-
stitution names John Marshall as the author of the Minority Report. See 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 136. Recent Marshall biographers, however, disagree. See
JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 601 n.79 (1996). A coauthor
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ten law which pervades all America, and which declare[s] libels against gov-
ernment to be a punishable offence. '126 According to the Report, "[t]o
contend that there does not exist a power to punish writings coming within
the description of this law, would be to assert the inability of our nation to
preserve its own peace. '"127 Not only was the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment no barrier to the Sedition Act, but the addition of the First
Amendment actually supported the Report's defense of the Sedition Act be-
cause "[i]t would have been certainly unnecessary thus to have modified the
legislative powers of Congress concerning the press, if the power itself does
not exist. ' 128 As far as seditious libel and free speech were concerned, the
freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment did not extend to such "licen-
tious" acts as libeling the government.
129
By appearing to embrace the unwritten power to enforce the common
law, the defenders of the Sedition Act seemed to reject the principle of enu-
merated federal power.' 30 Although the Ninth Amendment guarded against
latitudinarian constructions of delegated powers, it was the Tenth Amend-
ment that declared that all nonenumerated powers are reserved to the
states.1 3 1 Accordingly, James Madison and Thomas Jefferson raised the hue
and cry that Congress had transgressed the boundaries of federal power es-
tablished by the Tenth Amendment. 132 In his Kentucky Resolutions, Thomas
Jefferson wrote
[t]hat it is true, as a general principle, and is also expressly declared
by one of the amendments to the Constitution, that "the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people"; and that, no power over the freedom of religion, freedom
of speech, or freedom of the press, being delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, all law-
ful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were re-
served to the states or to the people.133
and I address in depth the question of John Marshall's role in the creation of the Minority Re-
port in an upcoming article. See Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall
and the Defense of the Alien and Sedition Acts (forthcoming) (on file with the author).
126 Marshall, supra note 124, at 137.
127 Id. at 136.
128 Id. at 137.
129 See id. at 138.
130 Although James Madison and other Virginia Republicans accused the Federalists of
having embraced unenumerated federal power, John Marshall denied that any Federalist be-
lieved the federal government had unenumerated power to enforce the norms of the common
law. See Letter from John Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), in 6 THE PAPERS OF
JOHN MARSHALL 23 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1984). The Minority Report itself can be construed
as either arguing in favor of unenumerated power to enforce the common law (see excerpt in
text above), or as arguing that enforcing the common-law offense of seditious libel was necessary
and proper to advancing its enumerated powers of Article I, Section 8.
131 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
132 See Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798), in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTTUnON, supra note 55, at 131; James Madison, Virginia Resolutions, in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 55, at 136.
133 Jefferson, supra note 132, at 131.
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In his Virginia Resolutions, Madison called on the states to join with
Virginia and Kentucky in declaring "that the acts aforesaid are unconstitu-
tional; and that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each, for
cooperating with this state, in maintaining unimpaired the authorities, rights,
and liberties, reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. '134
Madison defended the positions taken in the Virginia Resolutions in his Re-
port on the Alien and Sedition Acts. 135 In his Report, Madison further ex-
plained that Congress's attempt to exercise unenumerated common-law
powers violated the constitutional principle that "powers not given to the
government, were withheld from it," and that
if any doubt could have existed on this subject, under the original
text of the Constitution, it is removed as far as words could remove
it, by the 12th amendment . . . which expressly declares, that the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively,
or to the people. 136
Ultimately, the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison defeated the Federalists in the election of 1800, due in no
small part to popular reaction against the Alien and Sedition Acts. 137
Madison's celebrated "Report of 1800,11138 which Spencer Roane referred to
as the "Magna Charta" of the Republicans, 139 became a foundational docu-
ment for nineteenth-century advocates of states' rights.140 The Report was so
influential that Madison's Tenth Amendment-based argument against the
Acts had the effect of eclipsing the Ninth as the core constitutional provision
requiring the strict construction of federal power.
B. The Tenth Amendment and Madison's Report of 1800
It is difficult to overstate the influence of Madison's Report of 1800
among states' rights theorists in the decades between Jefferson's election and
the Civil War. St. George Tucker referred to Madison's Report numerous
times in his 1803 constitutional treatise, A View of the Constitution of the
United States, repeating in particular Madison's claim that Congress had ex-
134 Madison, supra note 132, at 136.
135 MADISON, supra note 42, at 608.
136 Id. at 610 (quotations omitted).
137 See Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1502-03 (1987).
According to Professor Amar, the popular response to the Acts, of which the Virginia and Ken-
tucky Resolutions played a major part, "effectively transformed the national election of 1800
into a popular referendum on these bills." Id. at 1502.
138 See, e.g., Stunt v. The Steamboat Ohio, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 362, 406 (Ohio D. Ct.
1855), reprinted in 4 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 49, 107 (Norwalk, Ohio, Laning Printing Co.
1897).
139 Spencer Roane, Hampden Essays, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 11-June 22, 1819, re-
printed in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 106, 113 (Gerald Gun-
ther ed., 1969).
140 See id.; CORNELL, supra note 47, at 245 (stating that the "Report of 1800" "would oc-
cupy a central place in the canon of opposition thought," and describing Madison's Report as the
"framework" upon which "Anti-Federalist ideas could be ... directed at Federalists").
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ceeded the bounds established by the Tenth Amendment. 141 When Jonathan
Elliot compiled the materials for his magisterial 1836 work, The Debates in
the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution,
among the few postadoption sources that he added was "[t]he Report on the
Virginia Resolutions, by Mr. Madison.' 1 42 It was not unusual for nineteenth-
century courts to refer to what was known as Madison's "celebrated report"
in discussing the scope of federal law. 143 In fact, courts in later decades
viewed the struggle over the Alien and Sedition Acts and the election of 1800
as a referendum on the proper interpretation of the Constitution. 144 Writing
in the 1860s, Judge Bell of the Texas Supreme Court described the event as a
titanic struggle over an unduly latitudinarian interpretation of federal power:
I take it for granted that we will not.., go back to that latitude of
construction, and to the reasoning by which the federalists of 1798
claimed for the congress of the United States the power to exercise
a censorship over the press, as a means necessary and proper to
carry into effect the power to suppress insurrections. We have been
accustomed to read, with the interest that attaches to the drama, the
history of the great struggle which elevated Mr. Jefferson to the
presidency. It is the first conspicuous landmark in the history of the
government of the United States under the constitution. It has al-
ways been claimed that the republican party performed a patriotic
service in resisting the tendency to a rapid consolidation of powers
in the general government, and that their illustrious leader was the
faithful sentinel who saw the danger to the constitution, and met it
with a noble devotion to the cause of liberty .... [A]nd in every
step which has been made towards a strict construction of the con-
stitution, the people have hailed the triumph of sound principles
and felt renewed confidence in the stability of republican
institutions.1 45
States' rights advocates in particular relied on Madison's Report as a
critical guide to state autonomy and proper interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. Virginia Chief Judge Spencer Roane1 6 cited Madison's Report in sup-
port of his contention that the Supreme Court had no authority to reverse the
decision of Virginia's highest court.147 When Chief Justice John Marshall up-
141 See Tucker, supra note 36, at 287 n.*; see also id. at 288, 302-03, 307.
142 See 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 50, at 546.
143 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 748-50 (1893) (Field, J., dissent-
ing); Stunt v. The Steamboat Ohio, supra note 138, at 107-08; Piqua Bank v. Knoup, 6 Ohio St.
342, 369-72 (1856).
144 See, e.g., Padelford, Fay & Co. v. Mayor of Savannah, 14 Ga. 438, 494-95 (1854) (dis-
cussing the battle over the Alien and Sedition Acts as a battle for a rule of strict construction of
the Constitution).
145 Ex parte Coupland, 26 Tex. 387, 418-19 (1862) (Bell, J., concurring).
146 Roane was one of the most influential states' rights advocates of the early nineteenth
century. See CORNELL, supra note 47, at 280-83; G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE,
1815-1835, at 558 (1988) (discussing Roane's "Hampden" essays).
147 See Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1, 29-31, 50-54 (1814), rev'd sub nom. Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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held the second Bank of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland,148
Roane published a series of essays critical of the McCulloch decision in the
Richmond Enquirer under the pseudonym "Hampden."'149 Repeatedly refer-
ring to the odious precedent of the Alien and Sedition Acts and Madison's
"celebrated report" of 1800,150 Roane argued that Congress and the Supreme
Court had once again invaded the reserved powers of the states:
It has been our happiness to believe, that in the partition of powers
between the general and state governments, the former possessed
only such as were expressly granted ... while all residuary powers
were retained by the latter.... This, it is believed, was done by the
constitution, in its original shape; but such were the natural fears
and jealousies of our citizens, in relation to this all important sub-
ject, that it was deemed necessary to quiet those fears, by the 10th
amendment to the constitution. 151
Tying the hated Sedition Acts to Marshall's opinion in McCulloch,
Roane argued that "[tihe latitude of construction now favored by the su-
preme court, is precisely that which brought the memorable sedition act into
our code."'1 52 In a famous paragraph, Roane declared "[tihat man must be a
deplorable idiot who does not see that there is no earthly difference between
an unlimited grant of power, and a grant limited in its terms, but accompa-
nied with unlimited means of carrying it into execution. ' '153
Only a few years later, John C. Calhoun relied on Madison's Report of
1800 in developing his own theory of interposition against the Tariff of
1828-the so-called Tariff of Abominations. 154 In his Exposition and Protest,
Calhoun based his strict reading of federal power on the principles of the
Tenth Amendment:
The Powers of the General Government are particularly enumer-
ated and specifically delegated; and all powers not expressly dele-
gated, or which are not necessary and proper to carry into effect
those that are so granted, are reserved expressly to the States or the
people. The Government is thus positively restricted to the exercise
of those general powers that were supposed to act uniformly on all
the parts-leaving the residue to the people of the States, by whom
148 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407-09, 425 (1819).
149 See Roane, supra note 139, at 108.
150 See id. at 148 (referring to Madison's "celebrated report of 1799"); see also id. at 113,
115-16 ("For truth, perspicuity and moderation, it has never been surpassed.... It was the
Magna Charta on which the republicans settled down, after the great struggle in the year 1799.").
151 Id. at 108; see also id. at 114-15, 149-50 (asserting that the Tenth Amendment merely
declared the principle that residuary powers not granted to the government were reserved to the
states and the people, and noting the existence of some judicial decisions that reflected this
principle).
152 Id. at 134.
153 Id. at 110.
154 JOHN C. CALHOUN, ExposrrloN AND PROTEST (1828), reprinted in UNION AND LIB-
ERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 311, 313-14 (Ross M. Lence, ed.,
1992).
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alone, from the very nature of those powers, they can be justly and
fairly exercised 155
As did all states' rights advocates during this period, Calhoun believed
that the Tenth Amendment established a rule of construction limiting the
scope of Congress's enumerated powers.156 Rejecting the idea that the U.S.
Supreme Court had the sole power to determine when federal power in-
truded upon the reserved rights of the states, Calhoun declared that this con-
tention "has been so ably refuted by Mr. Madison, in his Report to the
Virginia Legislature in 1800, and the Alien and Sedition Acts, as to supersede
the necessity of further comments on the part of the committee. '157
So influential was Madison's Report of 1800 that in Smith v. Turner1 5 8 -
one of the "Passenger Cases"-Justice John McKinley treated Madison's Re-
port as equally authoritative a guide to the proper interpretation of the Con-
stitution as the Federalist Papers and the records of the Philadelphia
convention.159 Even those commentators who rejected Madison's limited
construction of federal power nevertheless felt constrained to acknowledge
Madison's Report, if only to refute it.1 6 0
As a canonical document in states' rights advocacy, the Report of 1800's
use of the Tenth Amendment had the effect of establishing that provision as
equal, and often superior, to the Ninth Amendment as an expression of strict
construction. The Tenth's explicit reference to the reserved powers of the
states, moreover, made the Tenth a more rhetorically acceptable provision
than the Ninth to those who sought to construe the Constitution as a compact
between the federal government and the states (and not the undifferentiated
American people). 161 Madison's Report of 1800 did not wholly displace the
Ninth Amendment as the textual basis for strict construction of federal
155 Id. at 343.
156 JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (1850), reprinted in UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN
C. CALHOUN, supra note 154, at 79, 103 ("It is admitted, that [the Tenth Amendment's] principle
object was to prevent the reserved from being drawn within the sphere of the granted powers, by
the force of construction-a danger, which, at the time, excited great, and, as experience has
proved, just apprehension.").
157 CALHOUN, supra note 154, at 346.
158 Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
159 According to McKinley:
In the face of this fact, the debates in the Convention, certain numbers of the Fed-
eralist, together with Mr. Madison's report to the legislature of Virginia in 1799,-
eleven years after the adoption of the Constitution,-are relied on .... I have
been unable to find any thing in the debates of the Convention, in the Federalist, or
the report of Mr. Madison, inconsistent with the construction here given.
Id. at 453 (McKinley, J., concurring) (relying on Madison's Report, the Federalist, and the con-
vention debates to ascertain the meaning of the words migration and importation); see also State
v. Hunt, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 1, 71 (S.C. Ct. App. 1834) ("Mr. Madison, in his report upon the
Virginia Resolutions, has remarked upon the various meanings of the word 'States,' shewing the
correctness of these views. It is indeed true 'he says,' that the term 'States' is something used in
a vague sense, and sometimes in different senses according to the subject to which it is
applied.").
160 See, e.g., 1 STORY, supra note 80, at 287-88 & n.1.
161 See WHITE, supra note 146, at 487-94 (discussing compact theory and the role it played
in the early nineteenth-century constitutional debate).
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power; rather, the Report cemented in popular and professional understand-
ing the Tenth Amendment as a text suggesting, if not demanding, a strict
interpretation of enumerated federal power.
C. The Tenth Amendment and the Marshall Court
Arguments in favor of the strict construction of federal power presented
in St. George Tucker's Commentaries, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolu-
tions, and Madison's Report of 1800 were all based on the idea that the Con-
stitution was a compact or agreement between the state and the federal
government. 162 Avoiding an interpretation of the Constitution in a manner
that potentially eradicated one of the parties to the compact required a nar-
row construction of those powers that the states had delegated to the federal
government. 163
Following an upsurge of nationalist sentiment in the aftermath of the
War of 1812,164 the second and third decades of the nineteenth century wit-
nessed the further development of a more nationalist interpretation of fed-
eral power.165 Chief Justice John Marshall in particular rejected the compact
theory of the Constitution; his broad approach to federal power led him (and,
for a time, the Supreme Court) to reject the idea that any provision in the
Constitution expressed a rule of strict construction. 166 The struggle between
broad and narrow conceptions of federal power that occurred during the
Marshall Court era had the effect of further obscuring the Ninth as a rule of
construction, and further enhancing the role of the Tenth as the central guar-
antor of state autonomy.
In his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story ignored his
earlier use of the Ninth Amendment in Houston as supporting a limited con-
struction of enumerated federal power. 167 Story instead attacked St. George
Tucker's rule of strict construction as unsupported by the Constitution, refus-
ing to even acknowledge the role of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in
Tucker's theory.168 Story addressed the Ninth Amendment in a separate sec-
tion in his Commentaries, presenting the Ninth as no more than a restatement
of the Tenth Amendment's principle of enumerated federal power.169
Story wrote his Commentaries in the waning days of the Marshall
Court's nationalist reading of the Constitution. In cases like McCulloch v.
Maryland, Cohens v. Virginia,'170 and Gibbons v. Ogden,'17 1 John Marshall had
articulated a strongly nationalist vision of federal power, and rejected the
162 See id.
163 See Jefferson, supra note 92, at 276-80; MADISON, supra note 42, at 608; Randolph,
supra note 93, at 4; Tucker, supra note 36, at 140-44.
164 See WHITE, supra note 146, at 87.
165 See id.
166 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 124, at 136.
167 See 1 STORY, supra note 80, at 393; 3 id. at 751.
168 See 1 id. at 393-94.
169 See 3 id. at 751. In fact, Story titles his section on the Ninth Amendment, "Non-Enu-
merated Power," and his section on the Tenth, "Powers Not Delegated." Id.
170 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
171 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Tenth Amendment as imposing any kind of restrictive rule of interpreta-
tion. 172 In McCulloch, Marshall said nothing about the Ninth Amendment
and rejected the idea that the Tenth Amendment required a strict construc-
tion of federal power on the ground that the Tenth used less restrictive lan-
guage than its counterpart in the Articles of Confederation.1 73 In Gibbons,
Marshall again ignored the Ninth Amendment, despite the references to both
Story's opinion in Houston and Tucker's analysis in his Commentaries at oral
arguments before the Court.174 Marshall instead denied that there was even
"one sentence in the constitution" that called for a strict construction of fed-
eral power.175
The nationalist decisions of the Marshall Court generated enormous
public controversy, 176 and the Chief Justice found himself obligated to defend
his opinions in a series of newspaper essays.177 By the late 1820s, having
weathered several attempts to cabin the power of the judicial branch,178 the
Supreme Court backed away from its earlier aggressive approach to federal
power. 79 By the time Story dedicated his 1833 Commentaries to John Mar-
shall, the most influential days of the Marshall Court were behind it, with
Story's discussion of cases like McCulloch, Cohen, and Gibbons reading more
like a defense of Marshall's jurisprudence than a statement of bedrock law.
The arrival of Justice Taney on the Court in 1836 signaled the rise of a
states' rights-oriented interpretation of federal power-a reading that would
culminate in Dred Scott v. Sanford.180 The Taney Court rejected Marshall's
nationalist interpretations of federal power as reflecting unduly latitudinarian
readings of the Constitution. In cases like Mayor of New York v. Miln, the
Supreme Court moved away from Marshall's suggestion in Gibbons that fed-
eral commerce power was exclusive of concurrent state authority.18 1 As the
century progressed, the Court increasingly expanded the scope of exclusive
state power.182 Commentators rejected earlier broad readings of federal
172 See id. at 187-88; Cohens, 19 U.S. at 381-92, 441-44; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 406-07 (1819).
173 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406 (noting that-unlike the Articles, which re-
served all powers not expressly delegated-the Tenth Amendment omits the restrictive term
"expressly").
174 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 86.
175 Id. at 187-88.
176 See generally JoHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note
139.
177 See John Marshall, A Friend to the Union, PHILA. UNION, Apr. 24-28, 1919, reprinted in
JoI MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH v. MARYiLAND, supra note 139, at 78; John Mar-
shal, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, June 30-July 15, 1819, reprinted in
JoHN' MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 139, at 155.
178 See DwITrr WILEY JESSUP, REACTION AND ACCOMMODATION: THE SUPREME COURT
& POLITICAL CONFLICr, 1809-1835 (1978).
179 Compare Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 209-11 (suggesting in dicta that federal com-
merce power was exclusive of concurrent state authority), with Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 132-40 (1837) (establishing areas of concurrent state power to regulate
commerce).
180 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
181 Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 132-40.
182 See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 26 (1888) (finding that the police power of the
state is "as broad and plenary as its taxing power").
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power as conflicting with the principles of the Tenth Amendment. For exam-
ple, in his 1840 critique of Justice Story's Commentaries, Abel Upshur wrote:
The Constitution itself suggests that it should be strictly and not lib-
erally construed. The tenth amendment provides, that "the powers
not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, by
the Constitution, are reserved to the States or the people." There
was a corresponding provision in the articles of confederation,
which doubtless suggested this amendment. It was considered nec-
essary, in order to prevent that latitude of construction which was
contended for by one of the great political parties of the country,
and much dreaded and strenuously opposed by the other.18 3
In his speech on the Bank of the United States, James Madison wrote
that the Ninth Amendment "guarded against a latitude of construction,"
while the Tenth "excluded every power not within the Constitution itself."' 84
Upshur, on the other hand, presented the Tenth Amendment itself as "pre-
vent[ing] that latitude of construction."' 85 It is not just that Upshur trans-
formed the Tenth into a rule of construction-St. George Tucker and John
Taylor had earlier read the Tenth in a similar manner.186 Rather, the signifi-
cance of Upshur's approach is that it replaced Madison's original reading of
the Ninth.
Nor was Upshur alone in transforming earlier readings of the Ninth into
readings of the Tenth. Three years after Upshur's interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment, the Michigan Supreme Court took it upon itself to rewrite Jo-
seph Story's opinion in Moore, once again replacing the Ninth Amendment
with the Tenth.187 In Harlan v. People,188 Judge Felch cited Story's opinion in
Houston, but altered the critical passage:
And it is affirmed, by the same authorities, that a mere grant of
power in affirmative terms, does not, per se, transfer an exclusive
sovereignty on such subjects to the Union. In all cases not falling
within either of the classes already mentioned, the states retain ei-
ther the sole power, or a power which they may exercise concur-
rently with congress. This results not only from the general
principles on which the Union is founded, but is within the letter of
the tenth article of the amendments to the constitution, which de-
clares that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the
constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people. 189
183 ABEL P. UPSHUR, A BRIEF ENQUIRY INTO THE TRUE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF
OUR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: BEING A REVIEW OF JUDGE STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 98 (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1998) (1840).
184 See Madison, supra note 30, at 489.
185 See UPSHUR, supra note 183, at 98.
186 See supra notes 35-37, 101-04 and accompanying text.
187 See Harlan v. People, 1 Doug. 207, 211 (Mich. 1843).
188 Id.
189 Id.
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In this quote from Story's opinion, Felch simply changed "letter and
spirit of the eleventh amendment" 190 to "the letter of the tenth."191 Felch ap-
parently believed that Story had made a mistake, which he remedied by in-
serting the clause he believed correctly expressed the rule of strict
construction. Felch's rewriting of Story's opinion suggests how strongly the
Tenth Amendment had come to be seen as the primary constitutional provi-
sion calling for a limited construction of federal power. The Tenth Amend-
ment, not the Ninth, represented the principle of the glorious revolution of
1800. Despite Madison's earlier description of the Ninth as the text that pre-
vented latitudinarian construction of federal power, 192 it was Madison's invo-
cation of the Tenth Amendment in his Report of 1800 that focused the
attention of antebellum states' rights theorists on the Tenth as the key consti-
tutional text establishing a rule of strict construction.
III. The Fall and Rise of the Rule of Strict Construction
A. The New Deal and the Tenth Amendment
As noted in the previous Part, courts in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries continued to cite both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
as textual support for limited readings of federal power.193 Still, of the two,
the courts seemed to look to the Tenth Amendment as the primary guarantor
of state autonomy. Supreme Court cases like Slaughter-House1 94 and the
Civil Rights Cases195 further entrenched the standard view that the Tenth
Amendment, on its own, stood for a rule of strict construction of federal
power.196 Nevertheless, because both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
were read as expressing a restricted view of federal power, both clauses met
the same fate in the constitutional upheaval known as the New Deal
revolution.
1. Resistance to the New Deal
Faced with decades of limited construction of federal commerce
power,197 proponents of progressive legislation began to make claims of fed-
eral authority beyond those expressly enumerated in the Constitution. Ac-
190 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 49 (1820) (emphasis added).
191 Harlan, 1 Doug. at 211 (emphasis added).
192 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
193 The tradition held for both state and federal courts until the New Deal revolution of
1937. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 129 F. 630, 632-35 (C.C.N.D. Ala. 1904) (giving a limited
reading to the Fourteenth Amendment on the ground that unduly broad interpretations of fed-
eral authority interfere with state autonomy protected under the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments); Darweger v. Staats, 278 N.Y.S. 87, 92 (App. Div. 1935) (Rhodes, J., concurring) (striking
down National Industrial Recovery Act provision on the ground that it conflicted with both
Ninth and Tenth Amendments). See Lash, supra note 40, for a general discussion of this
jurisprudence.
194 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
195 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
196 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79-83; The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 10.
197 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (noting that the "making of
goods and the mining of coal are not commerce").
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cording to this alternate view, the federal government had a duty to promote
the general welfare of the people, and this duty included broad authority to
respond to the economic emergency of the Great Depression. The view was
not as much an interpretation of an enumerated power, which would raise
Ninth Amendment concerns, as it was an assertion of inherent federal power
to act in times of emergency-an assertion that raised issues under the Tenth.
In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 198 the government
argued that its authority to regulate local labor conditions under the Live
Poultry Code "must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis with
which Congress was confronted. '" 199 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Hughes rejected this claim to unenumerated "emergency powers" as conflict-
ing with the Tenth Amendment:
Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional
power. The Constitution established a national government with
powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to be both in
war and peace, but these powers of the national government are
limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these
grants are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because
they believe that more or different power is necessary. Such asser-
tions of extra-constitutional authority were anticipated and pre-
cluded by the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment .... 200
Similarly, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,201 the government argued in favor
of an unenumerated power to regulate local matters for the common good. 20 2
Once again, the Court rejected the argument on the basis of the Tenth
Amendment.20 3 Finally, in United States v. Butler,204 the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the Tax and Spending Clause as authorizing nonregulatory pro-
198 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
199 Id. at 528.
200 Id. at 528-29 (citations omitted). Hughes was not completely consistent on this point.
See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-44 (1934) (arguing that the Consti-
tution should be interpreted in light of public need); see also Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional
Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 459 (2001) (discussing Hughes's interpretation of the Constitution in Blaisdell).
201 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
202 Id. at 289-90.
203 According to the Court:
[T]he proposition that there are legislative powers affecting the Nation as a whole
which belong to, although not expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict
with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers. That this is such
a government clearly appears from the Constitution, independently of the Amend-
ments, for otherwise there would be an instrument granting certain specified things
made operative to grant other and distinct things. This natural construction of the
original body of the Constitution is made absolutely certain by the Tenth Amend-
ment. This amendment, which was seemingly adopted with prescience of just such
contention as the present, disclosed the widespread fear that the National Govern-
ment might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise
powers which had not been granted.
Id. at 293-94 (quotation omitted).
204 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
[Vol. 74:165
The Transformation of the Tenth Amendment
grams furthering the general welfare.205 The Court found, however, that
attempts to convert this authority into an unlimited power to regulate for the
general welfare still violated the Tenth Amendment:
We are not now required to ascertain the scope of the phrase "gen-
eral welfare of the United States" or to determine whether an ap-
propriation in aid of agriculture falls within it. Wholly apart from
that question, another principle embedded in our Constitution pro-
hibits the enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The act
invades the reserved rights of the states. . . . From the accepted
doctrine that the United States is a government of delegated pow-
ers, it follows that those not expressly granted, or reasonably to be
implied from such as are conferred, are reserved to the states or to
the people. To forestall any suggestion to the contrary, the Tenth
Amendment was adopted. The same proposition, otherwise stated,
is that powers not granted are prohibited. None to regulate agricul-
tural production is given, and therefore legislation by Congress for
that purpose is forbidden.206
Although the Tenth Amendment took center stage during the Supreme
Court's standoff with the Roosevelt administration, during this same period
the courts commonly cited to both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as dual
limitations on federal power. For example, in Acme, Inc. v. Besson,2°7 the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey invalidated the
wage and hour provisions promulgated under the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act208 on the ground that "interstate commerce" did not include local
manufacturing. 209 Judge Fake based his conclusion on Supreme Court prece-
dent and the interpretive rules demanded by the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments:
There is still another source to which we may refer in sustaining the
foregoing definition, and that is the well-known historic fact that the
people of the original states were extremely reluctant in granting
powers to the federal government and expressly laid down a rule of
constitutional construction in the Ninth Amendment, wherein our
forefathers said: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." And then, further, in the Tenth Amendment, we
find this express limitation upon the federal government: "The pow-
ers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." In view of the foregoing, we have labored in vain to
conclude that it was the intent of the Constitution to pass to the
Congress regulatory authority over those local, intimate, and close
relationships of persons and property which arise in the processes of
205 Id. at 64-66.
206 Id. at 68.
207 Acme, Inc. v. Besson, 10 F. Supp. 1 (D.N.J. 1935).
208 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
209 Acme, 10 F. Supp. at 6.
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manufacture, even though they may, in the broader sense, affect in-
terstate commerce. 210
Despite the fact that the Tenth played an independent role in supporting
a limited construction of federal power, the original understanding of the
Ninth as textual support for a rule of strict construction had not changed.
Most often, however, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were presented in
an undifferentiated manner as dual textual supports for a limited reading of
federal power. This pairing ensured that both amendments would meet the
same end in the dramatic reconfiguration of federal power that occurred at
the time of the New Deal.
2. The Ninth and Tenth as Truisms
In United States v. Darby,21l the Court declared that it would uphold
federal regulation of purely intrastate commerce if Congress reasonably con-
cluded that the activity in question affected interstate commerce.2 12 In doing
so, the Court rejected the idea that the Tenth Amendment required strict
construction of federal power.2 13 According to Justice Harlan Stone:
Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment .... The
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship be-
tween the national and state governments as it had been established
by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was
other than to allay fears that the new national government might
seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not
be able to exercise fully their reserved powers. From the beginning
and for many years the amendment has been construed as not de-
priving the national government of authority to resort to all means
for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and
plainly adapted to the permitted end.2 14
Although Justice Stone downplayed pre-1937 cases that enforced a very
different interpretation of federal power, his description of the Tenth
Amendment is literally correct. It is the text of the Ninth, not the Tenth, that
establishes a rule of construction. Justice Stone, however, did not address the
Ninth Amendment, or the vast number of cases using it along with the Tenth
as creating a limiting rule of construction; instead, Stone simply announced
the restoration of John Marshall's original vision of federal power.2 15 Like
210 Id. (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Neuendorf, 8 F. Supp. 403, 406-07
(S.D. Iowa 1934) (extending authority of Congress to regulate all businesses even directly affect-
ing interstate commerce would "emasculate the intent of the Tenth Amendment").
211 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
212 Id. at 115, 119.
213 See id.
214 Id. at 123-24 (citations omitted).
215 See id. at 119-21 (holding that Congress may create appropriate legislation to regulate
intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce). Bruce Ackerman refers to the
New Deal Court's attempt to ground their expansion of federal power in the original meaning of
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Marshall, Stone addressed only the Tenth Amendment and ignored the
Ninth.
By the time the Supreme Court decided Wickard v. Filburn2 16 in 1941,
not even the Tenth Amendment warranted discussion. Justice Jackson simply
followed the lead of Darby and assumed the correctness of Chief Justice Mar-
shall's interpretation of federal power-noting that Marshall had "described
the Federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. 12 17
Prior to the New Deal, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments generally
were read in pari materia as establishing a rule of construction limiting the
interpretation of federal power.2 18 This rule ensured the interpretation of
enumerated power in light of the people's retained right to local self-govern-
ment. Matters such as local commercial activity were presumptively reserved
to the states, and the construction of federal power was limited accord-
ingly.219 After the New Deal, and particularly after decisions such as Darby
and Wickard, the Court uncoupled the determination of the scope of federal
power from any consideration of the retained rights of the states.220 Once
the Court established a reasonable link between a legislative act and an enu-
merated power, Ninth and Tenth Amendment claims necessarily failed.2 21
Already implicit in lower federal court decisions,2 2 the Supreme Court
expressly adopted this toothless application of the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments in United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell.22 3 In Mitchell, a
group of federal employees challenged provisions of the Hatch Act 224 that
prohibited government workers from engaging in certain political activi-
ties. 22 5 In addition to First and Fifth Amendment claims, the employees
claimed the Act was a "deprivation of the fundamental right of the people of
the United States to engage in political activity, reserved to the people of the
United States by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. '226 Writing for the
Court, Justice Reed ruled that the Ninth and Tenth Amendment claims re-
quired no analysis of an independent right, but involved only questions of
enumerated federal power, noting that
the Constitution as the "myth of rediscovery." See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 43
(1991).
216 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
217 Id. at 120.
218 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
220 See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
221 See infra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
222 See Commonwealth & S. Corp. v. SEC, 134 F.2d 747, 753 (3d Cir. 1943) ("In view of our
conclusion that the order here complained of is within the commerce power Commonwealth's
contention that the order violates the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth amendments necessarily fails." (em-
phasis added)). The scope of federal power is determined independently of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments and, once found, negates any Ninth or Tenth Amendment claim. See United
States v. City of Chester, 144 F.2d 415, 418-20 (3d Cir. 1944) (noting the plaintiff's Ninth and
Tenth Amendment claims, but upholding federal action as falling within Congress's war powers
without further mention of the Ninth or Tenth Amendment).
223 United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947).
224 Hatch Political Activity Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939).
225 Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 78-82.
226 Id. at 83 n.12.
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[t]he powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Govern-
ment are subtracted from the totality of sovereignty originally in the
states and the people. Therefore, when objection is made that the
exercise of a federal power infringes upon rights reserved by the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must be directed toward
the granted power under which the action of the Union was taken.
If granted power is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of
those rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, must
fail.22 7
In rejecting the pre-1937 rule of strict construction of federal power, the
Supreme Court necessarily reduced both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
to mere truisms. The Court did so by focusing on the text of the Tenth
Amendment, which, in fact, does not create a rule of construction,228 and
ignoring the text and original meaning of the Ninth, which does.
229
It would be almost half a century before the Supreme Court would re-
turn to the rule of strict construction. By that time, not only had the histori-
cal role played by the Ninth Amendment been forgotten, but courts had
begun to cite the Ninth Amendment in support of expanded federal oversight
of matters previously reserved to the states.230 When the Court decided Lo-
pez in 1995, conventional wisdom read the Ninth Amendment as antithetical
to the principles underlying the Tenth. Accordingly, when the Court rei-
nvoked the rule of strict construction, it did so on the basis of the Tenth
Amendment alone. At that point, the reversal of the Ninth and the transfor-
mation of the Tenth became complete.
B. Griswold v. Connecticut and the Uncoupling of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments
Griswold triggered the modern debate over the meaning of the Ninth
Amendment. Seemingly unaware of 150 years of federalist-based jurispru-
dence, Justice Arthur Goldberg declared that the "Court has had little occa-
sion to interpret the Ninth Amendment. '231 Building on Justice Douglas's
brief reference to the Ninth Amendment in the opinion of the Court,
232
Goldberg argued that the Ninth Amendment supported the idea that liberty
under the Fourteenth Amendment "is not restricted to rights specifically
mentioned in the first eight amendments. '233 In support of this reading,
227 Id. at 95-96. The Court went on to uphold the Act, triggering a dissent by Justice Black,
who believed the plaintiff's First and Fifth Amendment rights had been violated. Id. at 105, 109
(Black, J., dissenting). Black made no mention of either the Ninth or Tenth Amendment in his
dissent.
228 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
230 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (discussing the penumbras or
zones of privacy formed by specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
231 Id. at 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
232 Id. at 484.
233 Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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Goldberg relied on his understanding of history, particularly the works of
James Madison and Joseph Story.234
Although both Madison and Story described the Ninth Amendment as
guarding state autonomy from federal interference, Goldberg argued that re-
fusing to strike down a state law banning the distribution of contraceptives to
married couples because the issue is not expressly mentioned in the Constitu-
tion would be "to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect what-
soever. '235 Denying that he had turned the Amendment on its head by
applying it against the states, Goldberg explained that his reading of the
Ninth merely supported an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as
protecting more rights than just those listed in the Constitution.236
In dissent, Justice Potter Stewart argued that the majority wrongly sug-
gested that the Ninth was more than a mere truism:
The Ninth Amendment, like its companion the Tenth, which this
Court held "states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered," was framed by James Madison and adopted by
the States simply to make clear that the adoption of the Bill of
Rights did not alter the plan that the Federal Government was to be
a government of express and limited powers, and that all rights and
powers not delegated to it were retained by the people and the indi-
vidual States. Until today no member of this Court has ever sug-
gested that the Ninth Amendment meant anything else, and the
idea that a federal court could ever use the Ninth Amendment to
annul a law passed by the elected representatives of the people of
the State of Connecticut would have caused James Madison no little
wonder.23 7
Stewart's dissent embodies the New Deal vision of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. To Justice Stewart, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were
unenforceable statements of principle. 238 This understanding had been the
general approach to both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments since Darby was
decided in 1941.239 Stewart correctly suggested that Madison would have
been surprised by Douglas's and Goldberg's use of the Ninth. But Madison
also would have been surprised by Stewart's preference that the Ninth not be
used at all.
In his dissent, Justice Hugo Black derided Goldberg's "recent discovery"
of the Ninth Amendment, thus implicitly agreeing with Goldberg that there
had been little previous judicial construction of the clause. 240 Accusing the
majority of returning to the discredited jurisprudence of the Lochner
Court,241 Black argued that "every student of history knows" the purpose of
the Ninth Amendment was "to assure the people that the Constitution in all
234 Id. at 488-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
235 Id. at 491 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
236 Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
237 Id. at 529-30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quotation omitted).
238 See id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
239 See supra notes 211-15, 218-21 and accompanying text.
240 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
241 See id. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
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its provisions was intended to limit the Federal Government to the powers
granted expressly or by necessary implication. ' 242 Black then noted the irony
of using the Ninth to interfere with the right to local self-government:
[Flor a period of a century and a half no serious suggestion was ever
made that the Ninth Amendment, enacted to protect state powers
against federal invasion, could be used as a weapon of federal
power to prevent state legislatures from passing laws they consider
appropriate to govern local affairs. 243 .
Despite the historical basis for Black's and Stewart's readings of the
Ninth Amendment, Goldberg's concurring opinion ignited a veritable cottage
industry of scholarship exploring libertarian readings of the Ninth Amend-
ment.244 All participants in this discussion, including those scholars opposed
to libertarian readings of the Ninth, have assumed that the debate takes place
on a jurisprudential tabula rasa: that prior to 1965, the Ninth Amendment
had rarely been cited and never discussed in any substantive manner. Over
time, the original roots of the Ninth Amendment became so obscured that
Judge Robert Bork famously declined to give the Ninth any meaning whatso-
ever.245 According to Judge Bork, absent any information regarding its origi-
nal meaning, the Ninth should be viewed no differently than text obscured by
an inkblot.246
It would be years before Madison's speech on the Bank of the United
States would be "discovered, ' 247 and even more time would pass before
Story's original discussion of the Ninth Amendment would come to light. By
that time, the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution would be in full swing,
based entirely on the Tenth Amendment.
Conclusion: Restoring the Original Meaning of the
Tenth Amendment
Although the Rehnquist Court has not expressly called into question its
earlier high-federalist decisions like Lopez, Morrison, and Printz, the most
recent decisions by the Court may signal a reluctance to follow the logic of
those decisions to their ultimate end.248 If so, this development will come as
242 Id. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting).
243 Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
244 See supra note 29 (listing examples of libertarian analyses of the Ninth Amendment).
245 See Testimony of Robert Bork (Sept. 15-16, 1987), in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE, supra note 29, at 427, 441.
246 See id.
247 See Eugene M. Van Loan III, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U. L. REV.
1, 14-17 (1968). In his 1989 collection of essays on the Ninth Amendment, Randy Barnett re-
printed Van Loan's article, which mentions Madison's speech, and wrote his own essay discuss-
ing the importance of the speech. See 1 THE RIGHTs RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 29,
at 149.
248 Compare Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-65, 375 (2001) (hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment bars application of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") to state employment decisions), with Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 (2004)
(holding Title II of the ADA valid as protection of fundamental right of access to the courts).
See also Savage, supra note 2. In one of the final decisions of the Rehnquist Court, a majority
upheld congressional power to ban state-authorized use of medicinal marijuana, relying on the
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a relief to the many critics of the Rehnquist Court who have argued that its
federalist jurisprudence is wholly unjustified as a matter of both text and his-
tory.2 49 If the Rehnquist majority is losing faith in its own federalist jurispru-
dence, however, it does so despite the fact that text, original meaning, and
historical application all support a limited reading of federal power.
The "work" of the federalist revolution has been accomplished through
the application of a rule of strict construction. This rule can be found in
Rehnquist Court decisions involving the scope of federal power under the
Interstate Commerce Clause,250 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,251
and sovereign immunity doctrine. 252 All three lines of decision have been
criticized for their lack of textual or historical roots.253 Criticism of the
Court's use of the Tenth Amendment has already been noted.254 But similar
criticism has been leveled at the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence.255 Like its treatment of the Tenth, the Court's expansive reading of
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is vulnerable to a purely textual
critique.256 The Eleventh Amendment expressly prohibits federal court juris-
diction in only a small category of cases.2 57 Since Hans v. Louisiana,258 how-
ever, the Court has read the Amendment to express only one aspect of a
broader principle of state immunity from federal court jurisdiction, well be-
yond those cases mentioned in the Amendment's text. 259 Indeed, the basis
for the Court's preserving state immunity from federal court jurisdiction
seems quite similar to the basis for the Court's preserving state immunity
from congressional legislation: both are based on a presumed limitation of
federal authority to interfere with state autonomy.
But it is the Court's application of the Tenth Amendment that is particu-
larly vulnerable to criticism. Unlike the Eleventh Amendment, which in fact
expresses a rule of construction,26° it is hard to escape Justice Stone's obser-
vation that "[t]here is nothing in the history of [the Tenth Amendment's]
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship be-
reasoning of the New Deal case Wickard v. Filburn. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2215
(2005).
249 See supra note 24 and accompanying text
250 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995).
251 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000).
252 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733-34, 758-60 (1999).
253 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; infra note 256 and accompanying text.
254 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
255 See NOONAN, supra note 3, at 59-61; Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 11-12; Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 429, 443 (2002).
256 See supra note 255.
257 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
258 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
259 See id. at 10-11, 15 (denying federal court jurisdiction over a suit brought against a state
by a citizen of the same state despite no express Eleventh Amendment bar).
260 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." (emphasis
added)).
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tween the national and state governments. '261 Indeed, even at the moment
of its adoption, Madison acknowledged that the Tenth Amendment was un-
necessary, and the clause was criticized in the state ratification conventions as
having no "real effect"-a criticism leveled by those Founders most inter-
ested in restricting federal power. 262
Despite these valid criticisms, however, the federalist rule of construc-
tion, which contemporary courts identify with the Tenth Amendment (and
occasionally the Eleventh), has both a textual basis and historic application.
The accidents of history that led to the rise of the Tenth Amendment and the
fall of the Ninth have resulted in the invocation of the right principles in the
wrong text. Originally, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were meant to
work together: the Tenth declaring the principle of reserved nonenumerated
power, and the Ninth ensuring that the powers reserved to the states would
not become a null set through the overly latitudinarian construction of enu-
merated federal authority. Both principles were thought necessary in order
to guarantee the people's retained right to local self-government. In other
words, without the Ninth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment does indeed
become a mere truism.
Understanding the proper source of this rule of construction and how it
became associated with the Tenth Amendment vindicates the jurisprudence
of the Tenth even as it refocuses attention back to the Ninth Amendment.
Absent this refocusing, the Tenth Amendment and its attendant federalist
jurisprudence remain vulnerable to criticism and, ultimately, reversal. In
other words, understanding the history of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
is necessary, if only to save the Tenth Amendment from itself. A renewed
appreciation of the textual roots of federalism seems particularly relevant as
both sides of the political spectrum now have come to embrace the value of
state autonomy.263
Refocusing the rule of construction back to the Ninth Amendment does
not reduce the Tenth to a mere truism. Even in the modern period, there are
occasional attempts by the federal government to assert inherent or
unenumerated powers. The more radical assertions of power during the New
Deal are one example,264 but so are attempts by the federal executive to seize
the tools of industry without congressional authorization.265 The Tenth
Amendment was designed to speak to both of these situations, and it would
apply to future attempts by any branch of the federal government to assert
powers beyond those enumerated in the Constitution.
261 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941); see also Chemerinsky, supra note
1, at 11-12.
262 See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 39-45, Ashcroft v. Raich, 543 U.S. 977 (2004) (No.
03-1454) (arguing in support of state authorization of medical marijuana use).
264 See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442-44 (1934) (arguing
that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of public need); see also supra notes 198-203
and accompanying text (discussing the Carter Coal and Schechter Poultry decisions).
265 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 573 (D.D.C.) (discussing
whether the President's "broad residuum of power" allowed him to directly seize steel plants),
aff'd, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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The Tenth Amendment not only denies unenumerated powers to the
federal government, it also forbids placing any unenumerated restrictions on
the states. According to the text, "[tihe powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people. ' '266 Just as the first portion of the
Tenth Amendment limits the powers of the federal government to no more
than those enumerated in the text, the second portion limits restrictions on
the states to no more than those enumerated in the text; all other powers are
reserved to the states or to the people.
Since 1965, there has been a lively debate regarding whether state law is
bound to protect rights beyond those listed in the text of the Constitution. In
Griswold, Justices Douglas and Goldberg suggested that the Ninth conceiva-
bly supported judicial enforcement of nonenumerated rights against the
states.267 But nonenumerated rights against the state are no different from
nonenumerated prohibitions on the exercise of state power. For example,
the prohibition against any state law impairing the obligation of contracts in
Article I, Section 10 expresses an individual right 268 and also constitutes one
of the powers "prohibited by [the Constitution] to the states" under the
Tenth Amendment.269 According to the Tenth Amendment, however, the
only powers not reserved to the states are those delegated to the federal gov-
ernment or prohibited by the Constitution to be exercised by the states.270
Again, this language means that the Tenth Amendment prevents not only
unenumerated federal power, it also forbids unenumerated restrictions on
state power. Since 1965, of course, such a reading of the Tenth Amendment
has been objected to as conflicting with the Ninth Amendment's protection
of "other rights. '271 Understanding the historic relationship of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments bars this attempt to make them antagonists and allows
for a more complete appreciation (and enforcement) of the Tenth
Amendment.
266 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
267 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
268 See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 654-63 (1819).
269 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; id. amend. X. There is no other way to make sense of the
Tenth's reference to "powers ... prohibited by [the Constitution] to the states" other than to
read it as referring to restrictions on state power such as those listed in Article I.
270 As Justice Baldwin wrote:
[T]he tenth amendment becomes a dead letter if the constitution does not point to
the powers which are "delegated to the United States," or "prohibited to the
states," and reserve all other powers "to the states respectively or the people."
Any enumeration of powers granted, any specific prohibitions on the states, will
not only become wholly unmeaning, if new subjects may be brought within their
scope, as means of enforcing the given powers, or the prohibitions on the states
extended beyond those which are specified, but the implied powers and implied
prohibitions must be more illimitable than those which are express.
HENRY BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DEDUCED FROM THE POLITICAL HISTORY AND CONDI-
TION OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, FROM 1774 UNTIL 1788, at 195 (1837).
271 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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Since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, of course, new restrictions on
state power have been added to the Constitution, particularly those found in
the Fourteenth Amendment. As I have argued elsewhere, there is good rea-
son to believe the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause
embraces not only provisions in the first eight amendments, but also com-
mon-law rights.272 Nevertheless, whatever restrictions may have been placed
on state power by the Privileges or Immunities Clause or the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, these restrictions exist as a matter of
textual interpretation, and not judicial incorporation of rights beyond those
enumerated in the text of the Constitution.
Limiting restrictions on the states to those listed in the Constitution may
seem thin gruel to states' rights advocates who are well aware of how broadly
courts can interpret texts like the Due Process Clause. The Tenth Amend-
ment, however, was never intended to stand alone; preventing unduly latitu-
dinarian constructions of federal power is the goal the Ninth Amendment
originally was meant to accomplish. In this manner, understanding the origi-
nal meaning and application of both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
reveals two provisions uniquely crafted to work together, each playing its
distinct role in preserving constitutional federalism.
It is ironic that Madison's Report of 1800, by playing up the Tenth
Amendment, helped fuel a jurisprudence that obscured the textual roots and
original structure of federalism under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. By
stretching the scope of the Tenth Amendment beyond textual plausibility, the
jurisprudence of federalism remains vulnerable to restriction and reversal.
Restoring the Tenth Amendment to its proper place in the arena of constitu-
tional interpretation thus does nothing to endanger federalism. It places fed-
eralism on firmer ground.
272 See Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony, 33 U. RICH. L. REV.
485, 598 (1999).
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